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Background: The burden of disease due to non-communicable diseases (NCDs) is rising in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs) and funding for global health is increasingly limited. As a large contributor of
development assistance for health, the US government has the potential to influence overall trends in NCDs.
Results-based financing (RBF) has been proposed as a strategy to increase aid effectiveness and efficiency through
incentives for positive performance and results in health programs, but its potential for addressing NCDs has not
been explored.
Methods: Qualitative methods including literature review and key informant interviews were used to identify
promising RBF mechanisms for addressing NCDs in resource-limited settings. Eight key informants identified by area
of expertise participated in semi-structured interviews.
Results: The majority of RBF schemes to date have been applied to maternal and child health. Evidence from
existing RBF programs suggests that RBF principles can be applied to health programs for NCDs. Several options
were identified for US involvement with RBF for NCDs.
Conclusion: There is potential for the US to have a significant impact on NCDs in LMICs through a comprehensive
RBF strategy for global health. RBF mechanisms should be tested for use in NCD programs through pilot programs
incorporating robust impact evaluations.
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Health aidBackground
The current economic climate has led donor governments
to reduce spending in all areas, including global health
initiatives. Meanwhile, low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs) are facing significant health challenges. Despite
progress in some health indicators in the past 20 years,
challenges from non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are
increasing [1].
Increased funding for global health may be unlikely in
the current economic climate. While numerous public
and private entities are important funders of global health
efforts, this paper focuses on the role of the United States* Correspondence: chelsey.beane@alumni.unc.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orgovernment because of its influence on global health
trends as the largest donor of development assistance for
health (DAH). Currently, most US funding for global
health is bilateral and disease-specific in nature, and
finances program inputs with limited emphasis on health
outcomes. These trends have prompted a renewed search
for improvements in aid effectiveness and efficiency.
While various financing strategies are currently under re-
view, Results-Based Financing (RBF) mechanisms, which
incentivize performance or results, have shown promising
results in recent years [2,3].
RBF mechanisms have been applied to infectious dis-
eases and maternal and child health, but very few have
specifically focused on NCDs. Research in this area has
also neglected RBF for NCDs. To date, the US has sup-
ported RBF for global health through the Global Fundtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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Challenge Corporation (MCC), Health Systems 20/20,
and USAID-supported projects. However, the US does
not currently have an overall strategy for RBF [4]. As a
major provider of DAH, the US has the potential to sig-
nificantly impact NCDs in LMICs using RBF.
This study identifies specific RBF mechanisms, addresses
their potential for use in NCD programs in LMICs, and
presents options for US involvement. As few NCD pro-
grams to date have used RBF strategies, this analysis draws
on evidence from existing RBF programs, which are mainly
focused on maternal and child health and communicable
diseases, and therefore addresses the challenge presented
by the dichotomy between infectious diseases and NCDs
that is common in global health. Furthermore, while this
paper focuses on RBF specifically, it should be noted that
RBF is part of a larger and more comprehensive strategy
for addressing NCDs globally. This paper does not seek
to examine the various other approaches to combatting
NCDs.
The rising burden of NCDs
While significant progress has been made in certain
areas of global health [5,6], the burden of disease from
NCDs – such as cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, cer-
tain types of cancers and chronic respiratory diseases –
is rising. There were 36 million deaths due to NCDs in
2008 [5]. Tobacco use causes more deaths globally than
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis (TB) combined,
and 80% of those tobacco-related deaths are in the
developing world [7]. NCDs cause about 56% of all
deaths in LMICs and 46% of the disease burden in
terms of disability-adjusted life-years [8]. Developing
countries are facing higher morbidity and mortality
from various types of cancer, some of which are attribut-
able to infectious diseases [9]. The disease burden due
to NCDs is expected to increase rapidly [8]. Deaths due
to NCDs are projected to reach 55 million by 2030, up
from 36 million 2008 [10]. Furthermore, evidence sug-
gests that NCDs disproportionately affect the poor,
cause poverty, and hinder economic development [11].
Trends in development assistance for health
Until 2008, overall trends in DAH were positive, espe-
cially over the past decade [12]. The US is the largest
donor of DAH in terms of absolute dollars; as a percent-
age of GDP, however, the US ranks 10th [13]. While US
funding for global health increased from $4.4 billion in
2004 to $9.6 billion in 2008, this represented only .083%
of US GDP [13,14]. There have been large increases in
DAH, but only about 3% goes towards NCDs [15].
Most US funding for global health is channeled
through the Global Health Initiative (GHI), created in
2009 to promote coordination for global health withinthe US government. While the GHI was authorized in
2009 for $63 billion over a six-year period, actual fund-
ing is determined annually by the US Congress. To curb
US spending and reduce debt, funding for the GHI has
been flat since 2009 at just under $9 billion annually in
absolute terms [16]. Entering its fourth year in 2012, the
GHI reached only 56% ($35 billion) of its originally pro-
posed six-year budget [17].
Not only is US funding for global health becoming
stagnant, but a recent report by the Center for Global
Development ranked the US 29th out of 31 major
donors on aid efficiency, with USAID ranking the lowest
for maximizing efficiency when compared to five other
US government agencies [18]. As the largest bilateral
donor government for global health, US government
contributions have a significant impact on overall trends.
Given the growing challenges to global health and the
uncertainty of resources, more efficient and effective
DAH is urgently needed.
Methods
Three RBF mechanisms were chosen for evaluation.
Using literature review and key informant interviews the
three were analyzed for potential use in strengthening
NCD health programs. Mechanisms were chosen for
their applicability to global health generally and NCDs
specifically, and for their feasibility for use by the US
government. Key informants were chosen for their ex-
pertise in global health, RBF and NCDs.
Results-based financing mechanisms
A summary of RBF mechanisms considered for this study
is provided in Table 1. The World Bank defines RBF as, “a
cash payment or non-monetary transfer made to a na-
tional or sub-national government, manager, provider,
payer or consumer of health services after predefined
results have been attained and verified. Payment is condi-
tional on measurable actions being undertaken.” [19].
Five main types of RBF are outlined by the World Bank,
of which three were chosen for inclusion in this analysis:
Performance-Based Financing (PBF), Performance-Based
Contracting (PBC), and Conditional Cash Transfers
(CCT). PBF and PBC are very similar. In PBF, payment is
made only to providers (versus beneficiaries) and is typic-
ally financial in the form of fee-for-service. PBF is predom-
inantly a supply-side intervention but can also incorporate
demand-side incentives. Payment is stipulated by the de-
gree or quality to which services are completed. PBC offers
a fixed price for an output or outcome with a variable in-
crease/decrease in payment based on performance. PBC is
typically applied to non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) [19]. Finally, CCTs are demand-side interventions
that provide incentives directly to program beneficiaries
and seek to motivate them to engage in certain desirable
Table 1 Inclusion/Exclusion of results-based financing mechanisms
Mechanism Definition Inclusion/Exclusion criteria
Output-Based Aid
(OBA)
A results-based mechanism that is used to deliver basic infrastructure and social
services to the poor
Excluded for use predominantly
outside of the health sector
Cash on Delivery
(COD)
A mechanism that gives recipients full responsibility and authority over funds paid in
proportion to verified measures of progress toward a single specific outcome
Excluded for political difficulty in
agent having complete control
Performance-Based
Financing (PBF)
Fee-for-service paid to providers conditional on specific predefined indicators for
degree and/or quality
Included for use in health sector and
political feasibility
Performance-Based
Contracting (PBC)
A fixed price for an output or outcome with a variable increase/decrease in payment
based on performance, typically applied to NGOs
Included for use in health sector and
political feasibility
Conditional Cash
Transfers (CCTs)
A demand-side mechanism that provides incentives directly to program beneficiaries Included for use in health sector and
political feasibility
Source: World Bank [19], CGD [20].
Table 2 Characteristics of key informant participants
Item Number
Key informants identified (#) 10
Total participants (#) 8
Organizations represented (#) 7
Avg. experience in global health (years) 24
Participants with expertise in RBF (#) 6
Participants with expertise in NCDs (#) 4
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Policy levers, such as tobacco and alcohol taxes, regula-
tion of the food industry, and efforts to reduce salt and
sugar consumption play an important role in NCD preven-
tion. However, such policies were excluded from consider-
ation in this study, as they are likely to be the decision of
governments in individual countries, may face significant
policy obstacles, and necessitate minimal US government
involvement. A comprehensive NCD strategy for global
health, however, should consider RBF in addition to other
interventions and policy efforts to achieve behavior change
or address the risk factors for NCDs.
Key informant interviews
An overview of key informant interviews is provided in
Table 2. Interviews were used to collect data related to
the experience, knowledge and opinions of key infor-
mants. Key informants were identified through a review
of the literature and through the academic network at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Parti-
cipants were selected using purposeful sampling. Ten
experts who met the selection criteria of a minimum of
ten years experience in global health and with expertise
in one or more of RBF, PBF, PBC, CCTs, or NCDs were
selected and contacted via email by CRB to participate
in the study.
Of ten identified experts, eight participated in semi-
structured interviews (two did not respond during the
study period). Information about the study was provided
to participants and consent to participate was received
via email before data collection as well as verbally at the
time of the interviews. Participants represented seven
organizations and had an average of 24 years of experi-
ence in global health, with experience in every region of
the world. Each participant was interviewed by CRB
concerning RBF, NCDs, and US involvement. Interviews
were conducted by telephone or Skype between January
and March 2012. Data collection ended after interviews
were conducted with all participants. Interviews weresemi-structured and used an interview guide developed by
CRB. Interview questions were open ended and interviews
were recorded and detailed notes were taken. Where pos-
sible, secondary data were used to complement data col-
lected from key informant interviews.
Interview responses were systematically categorized
and thematic analysis was used to identify and describe
themes.
Results
Experience of RBF to date
The evidence from RBF for health is mixed. Given the
diversity of RBF schemes, there is significant variabil-
ity between projects. The design of RBF programs is
highly context-specific. Health indicators and per-
formance incentives are largely dependent upon the spe-
cific health needs and risk factors of the population, the
health system and infrastructure in the country, and the
priorities of stakeholders. Limited and/or inadequate moni-
toring and evaluation further complicate efforts to review
RBF programs. A Cochrane review of the effects of paying
for performance in health care in LMICs concluded that
more robust and comprehensive studies are needed, a
finding supported by other studies of RBF as well [21-24].
More extensive monitoring and evaluation is particularly
necessary for showing results in the long-term [25]. Des-
pite the need for additional evidence, it has been sug-
gested that RBF can be an important tool for addressing
efficiency and accountability, as well as health sector re-
form more broadly [26].
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evaluated RBF program. Evidence from Rwanda is pro-
mising. The impact evaluation of Rwanda’s PBF program
determined the effect on fourteen maternal and child
health indicators [27]. While some indicators showed more
positive results than others, overall results demonstrated
that RBF can help to increase service delivery and quality
of care, improving health sector performance [28]. Various
other PBF programs have demonstrated positive or mixed
results, such as PBF schemes in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Egypt, and Burundi [29-31]. Less successful pro-
grams, such as the Tanzania PBF scheme, have provided
important lessons [32].
PBC programs, like PBF, have generally produced en-
couraging results. A PBC scheme in Cambodia found
that contracting NGOs was effective in increasing ser-
vice delivery [33]. Promising results have also come from
other countries, such as PBC programs in Liberia and
Afghanistan [34,35]. A PBC scheme in Southern Sudan,
however, experienced significant implementation chal-
lenges [36], and in Uganda various survey rounds found
no impact from PBF schemes. Lessons from Uganda in-
clude the need for substantial enough incentives directly
tied to results, autonomy for health facilities to make
decisions and to use resources, and rigorous verification
of results [37].
Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico is the largest and
most cited CCT program. This program provided incen-
tives to households in the form of cash transfer pay-
ments to women conditional on engaging in certain
behaviors related to child health, nutrition and educa-
tion. Evaluation has shown success in improving child
health indicators, among other areas [38]. A similar pro-
gram in Brazil, BolsaFamilia, however, produced no
positive results in terms of health status, but succeeded
in reducing poverty, suggesting that demand-side incen-
tives alone may not be enough to improve health out-
comes [39,40]. Other CCT programs, such as the Janani
SurakshaYojana program in India, have shown positive
yet mixed results [41]. Psychological research has
demonstrated in clinical trials that incentives can be ef-
fective in changing behaviors related to smoking and
drug use as well, however, these findings must also be
proven in population-based interventions [42].
While both PBF and PBC programs have produced
mixed results, on the whole there is much encouraging
evidence. Demonstrated successes from some programs
and lessons taken from others, suggest that both of these
approaches could be applied to NCDs. CCT programs,
have been successful at reducing poverty, which has im-
portant health implications. CCT programs could have
potentially significant effects on risk factors for NCDs, in-
cluding diet, exercise, and tobacco use, as well as prevent-
ive measures for certain types of cancers. The benefit ofusing supply-side interventions in tandem with demand-
side incentives, suggests that the use of CCTs for NCDs
may be most effective when combined with other supply-
side programs.
Applicability of RBF to NCDs
While most RBF programs have focused on Millennium
Development Goal (MDG)-related health issues, usually
on maternal and child health (MCH), a few have included
NCDs. In Belize, a PBF program designed to scale up
access and improve quality of health services targeted
chronic illnesses in addition to prenatal and postnatal
care. Evaluation of the six month pilot showed an increase
in use of primary care and the diagnosis and treatment of
diabetes and hypertension, the country’s top two causes of
death [43,44]. In Abu Dhabi, the Weqaya (or prevention)
program has used performance incentives for NCDs to
improve quality and measurable health indicators through
the use of Disease Management Programmes (DMPs) to
address compliance with clinical care and behavior change
related to specific risk factors at the patient level. As the
program was initiated in 2006, the long-term effects are
yet to be seen [45].
Few RBF-NCD programs may have been initiated be-
cause the epidemiological nature of NCDs does not eas-
ily lend itself to RBF. Programs aimed at NCDs often
involve major health behavior change and long-term
interventions. Incorporating RBF into these programs
is more difficult, compared to one-time or short-term
interventions, such as immunizations [46]. A RBF expert
from the World Bank made the distinction that RBF
focuses on both health outputs and outcomes. It is more
challenging, however, to have specific measurable indica-
tors for health outcomes that may occur over long time
periods, which is the case for many NCD indicators.
This is due to the need to provide incentives on the
supply-side on a regular basis (i.e. monthly or quarterly)
when using PBF. Therefore, incentives to health facilities
are often linked to more short-term outputs, such as
immunizations, antenatal care, institutional deliveries,
growth monitoring, and family planning. For example, a
NCD health intervention focused on tobacco use might
use smoking prevalence as measured by population-
based survey data as an indicator. Tying incentives to
percentage decreases in smoking prevalence, however,
would be difficult. Instead, it might be more effective to
use the number of people enrolled in smoking cessation
programs as an indicator, allowing incentive payments to
providers to be made quarterly.
Rena Eichler and Ruth Levine note the potential of RBF
for NCDs based on evidence from developed-country
settings [46]. For example, a supply-side intervention for
diabetes in the United States demonstrates the potential
of performance incentives for chronic conditions [46].
Table 3 Common themes from semi-structured interviews
1 Key elements of successful
RBF programs
Political commitment, government
ownership, buy-in of stakeholders
Clearly defined rules, understanding of
indicators; accountability, verification of
indicators
Measuring and evaluation
Design of program, piloting and testing;
participatory approach
Flexibility in implementation;
communication, transparency,
sustainability
2 Areas of health for which
RBF traditionally used
Maternal and child health; MDGs 4
and 5
Health service delivery, primary care,
quantity and quality of services
3 Potential use of RBF for
NCDs
Application of RBF to any service
delivery
Incentivizing preventive and health
promotion activities; national,
institutional, and individual levels
Part of package of essential health
services; combining efforts for
communicable and non-communicable
diseases
4 Challenges in taking a RBF
approach
Variation in capacity of donor agency
representatives
Use of RBF as panacea, depletion of
resources; unintended consequences
Insufficient ownership and
accountability; corruption
Technical assistance-intensive to
establish new/sustainable systems
Complexity of RBF; significant time for
design and implementation
Skepticism about RBF mechanisms
5 Potential for US
involvement with RBF for
NCDs
Collect best practices from RBF; assess
epidemiological situation
Engage stakeholders; take participatory
approach
Pilot programs to test applicability of
RBF for NCDs; increase funding for NCDs
Include NCDs as part of package of
essential health services; avoid
dichotomy between communicable and
non-communicable diseases
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viors to reduce consumption of tobacco and alcohol but
have not been successful in the long-term [46]. The min-
imal available evidence suggests that supply-side RBF
programs for NCDs are likely to be more effective than
demand-side programs.
Although little evidence is available on RBF for NCDs,
analysis of RBF programs for MCH, communicable dis-
eases, and health systems strengthening (HSS) provides
a reasonable basis for applying RBF concepts to NCDs.
NCD programs would benefit from improvements in
service delivery, quality, and health sector performance
that may result from RBF programs directed at MCH or
HSS [3]. For example, improved access to essential med-
icines and primary care could mean increased adherence
to chronic disease medications and increased rates of
screening for certain types of cancers. Improved health
care quality could include indicators for health IT, which
could in turn improve chronic disease management.
Broader health system effects from RBF could have
meaningful implications for NCDs.
Despite many challenges, application of RBF princi-
ples to NCDs has great potential. A summary of com-
mon themes from key informant interviews can be seen
in Table 3. Expert testimony highlighted the potential of
RBF and cautioned about the challenges, such as the
long-term effects of NCDs and health behaviors exter-
nal to the health system. Even these behaviors such as
diet and exercise, may lend themselves to incentive pro-
grams. The potential for RBF, key informants noted,
depends on country-specific priorities and risk factors.
An expert on RBF from the World Bank saw potential
in using RBF for preventive and health promotion ser-
vices, two areas into which NCDs fall. It is important to
integrate NCD indicators into existing RBF schemes
where possible. There is also potential for linking efforts
to reduce NCDs to a RBF mechanism as part of a larger
package of essential health services. Kathy Kantengwa,
an expert on PBF from MSH, stated that RBF can apply
to any service delivery, and therefore could be used for
early detection of NCDs and management. She stated:
“The RBF principles for communicable disease can be
adapted to the NCDs” [47].
The challenge for NCDs arises in determining which
services need to be purchased, how and by whom, as
well as how to measure the results. Patricio Marquez,
Lead Health Specialist at the World Bank suggested
using existing RBF programs to identify the entry points
to cover some of the interventions that may have an im-
pact on the onset of NCDs [48].
Experts on NCDs identified various approaches for
utilizing RBF mechanisms. Rachel Nugent, an expert onNCDs from the University of Washington, noted that
the need for patient involvement in managing NCDs
lends itself to incentive programs for both prevention
and treatment related to NCD risk factors. Incentives
could be provided to eat and exercise correctly, for
tobacco cessation, or for adherence to medication [49].
Patricio Marquez suggested using HIV programs as an
opportunity to target certain forms of cancer, using ma-
ternal health schemes to also affect cervical cancer or
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control programs [48]. Other examples of NCDs with
infectious components include Hepatitis B and liver can-
cer, diabetes and TB, and lymphoma and malaria [50]. An
important aspect of MCH programs is childhood malnu-
trition, a leading risk factor for NCDs such as diabetes.
Given the interconnectedness of communicable diseases,
MCH and NCDs, health intervention efforts could be
complementary. In the words of Patricio Marquez:
“It’s time to start thinking of the patient as a whole.
Let’s stop seeing the patient or populations by disease.
Because the interconnection between communicable
and non-communicable diseases is there. So the
question is how we adopt a global health strategy that
avoids the dichotomy. By doing that we will be able to
prevent the proliferation of government programs that
in some cases create distortions” [48].
Other key informants stressed the importance of taking
a policy-level approach, often in addition to individual-
level interventions. Dr. Sameh El-Saharty, a Senior Health
Policy Specialist at the World Bank, listed several inter-
ventions that could benefit from a RBF strategy including
banning tobacco advertisements and smoking in public
places, encouraging exercise and seatbelt use, and incen-
tivizing industries to use healthier foods. At the institu-
tional or sub-national level the same mechanisms could
be used to incentivize institutions to adopt programs or
revise procedures, such as clinical protocols or health in-
surance programs, and to introduce screening programs
for conditions such as cancer and cardiovascular disease.
RBF could be used at the sub-national level to incentivize
states, regions, or districts, or on the supply-side to pro-
vide incentives at the service delivery level [51]. From
supply-side to demand-side, national-level to individual-
level, and NCD-focused to basic health service-focused
programs, experts agreed that RBF could be used to affect
NCDs in resource-limited countries.
Key elements of successful RBF programs
Experience from RBF programs has provided lessons use-
ful when designing NCD programs using RBF mechan-
isms. RBF experts specified numerous key factors in
designing and implementing successful RBF programs,
such as political commitment, a participatory approach,
clearly defined rules and targets, strong verification sys-
tems, and robust measuring and evaluation. A summary
of these themes can be seen in Table 3. One expert on
RBF from the World Bank said:
“RBF is so different from traditional input-based
financing, in order for it to work, you need political
commitment, and you need commitment fromtechnical levels of Ministry of Health and Ministry of
Finance, to be able to make the whole thing work.
People really have to be convinced. . . And that’s not
unique to RBF, but it’s more important in RBF because
it’s such a different system.”
Various other elements were stated as being key to
developing a successful program. Testing mechanisms on
a small scale through pilot projects is crucial in identifying
potential challenges early on. Joseph Naimoli, an expert
from USAID/CDC, stated:
“They spend a considerable amount of time designing
these programs and getting them right. And also, they
spend some time in piloting and testing these things in
a smaller geographic area – like at the district level or
multiple districts – and spend some time
understanding what the potential obstacles are and
trying to work those obstacles out. I think those kinds
of programs are the most successful” [52].
Flexibility in implementation and the ability to adapt
to context-specific conditions, having basic health infra-
structure in place, and developing open communication
are also central.
Discussion
US involvement
Although the US has not yet formed a comprehensive
RBF strategy for DAH, it supports various RBF programs.
Currently, USAID supports countries both directly and
indirectly through the funding of technical partners. In
these ways, USAID has supported RBF programs in
Rwanda, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Egypt, South Africa, Southern
Sudan, Cameroon, and Haiti, among others. RBF could be
an important mechanism in the broader global health
agenda of value for money, which is being addressed by
the Center for Global Development, the UK’s Department
for International Development (DFID), and the Global
Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, among others.
Donor governments have used RBF to promote health,
increase aid effectiveness and improve outcomes. They
have the ability to use their resources to encourage pro-
viders, patients, and systems to act in certain ways to
achieve specific outcomes [46]. An expert from USAID/
CDC, stated that the first goal of RBF for the US govern-
ment is health outcomes related to MCH per MDGs 4
and 5, and HSS as outlined by the WHO building blocks
[52]. Funding and budget considerations also play a role,
as well as aid effectiveness. An expert on PBF from
MSH observed:
“The development assistance is from the people, so
they want to know that each dollar spent is adding
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outcomes that they are meant for” [47].
The US government, through its global health entities,
can take a variety of steps to make the most appropriate
use of RBF and to address the growing NCD burden in
LMICs countries. Four specific measures are offered for
consideration below.
1. Collect best practices. US government agencies
should review the best practices and lessons learned
from existing RBF programs. This effort can build on
the Health Systems 20/20 pay-for-performance (P4P)
Case Study Series. By understanding the experience
with communicable diseases, MCH and HSS, RBF
programs for NCDs can avoid known pitfalls and
have the greatest possible impact. The risk factors for
NCDs and effective prevention and treatment
strategies have been well documented. The best
practices for reducing NCDs in resource-limited
settings should also be reviewed and utilized.
2. Access epidemiological data in countries where the
US already has large development assistance
programs. Identify the NCD risk factors and
potential areas that should be targeted for health
interventions. Target specific NCDs that are linked
with certain communicable diseases or incorporate
NCD components into existing primary care and
health system strengthening efforts.
3. Take a participatory approach and engage
stakeholders. The best results may arise through
being pragmatic and flexible, and encouraging buy-in
from US representatives, partner country
governments, program managers, health workers and
providers, and other key stakeholders.
4. Invest in pilot programs. Only through testing the
applicability of RBF for NCDs will a thorough
understanding of its potential effects be gained.
Incorporating robust monitoring and evaluation of
pilot programs will strengthen the body of evidence
for RBF as a whole, and provide preliminary evidence
for the use of RBF for NCDs.
There are a few additional strategies to consider while
engaging in the above options with regard to RBF for
NCDs. One is to include NCDs as part of a larger pack-
age of health services. As has been demonstrated in
other areas, taking a vertical approach with RBF can
have unintended consequences, such as the diversion of
resources, perverse incentives among providers and
within the health system, and corruption. Another is to
increase funding allocated for NCDs. The majority of US
DAH today is earmarked for infectious diseases. As
NCDs continue to increase throughout the developingand developed world, the current distribution of funds
will need to be altered. Incorporating NCDs into current
global health programs is one way to bridge this gap.
It should also be noted that other measures not specific-
ally highlighted in interviews, such as the need to work
closely with other donor governments and multilateral
entities to incorporate RBF for NCDs into existing health
programs and RBF schemes, are also important. Finally,
any RBF mechanism used for NCDs should be part of a
much broader strategy for reducing NCDs in LMICs. Such
a strategy could include efforts to promote lifestyle
changes to address the risk factors for NCDs both domes-
tically and internationally, as US national efforts have the
potential to influence trends globally. By considering mul-
tiple strategies and using best practices for prevention and
treatment, there is potential for the US to be a leader in
the global fight against NCDs.
Limitations
The context-specific nature of this study limits the abil-
ity to generalize results, or to make concrete conclusions
about the role of RBF for NCDs. Furthermore, as most
RBF programs have been focused on MCH and commu-
nicable diseases, there is little evidence specific to RBF
for NCDs. To increase reliability and rigor, a larger num-
ber of key informant interviews with greater variety in
areas of expertise would have been beneficial. Due to
time and resource constraints, the number of key in-
formant interviews was limited to eight.
Limitations to the qualitative interviews include selec-
tion and response bias. Key informants were intentionally
recruited to represent a variety of organizations and areas
of expertise. The two non-respondents may have revealed
unrepresented viewpoints on RBF and NCDs; however,
the goal of the interviews was to identify themes based
on expert opinion, which was satisfactorily accomplished.
The researchers’ influence on the formulation on the re-
search question, data collection and analysis introduces
the possibility of research bias. However, data collection
and interpretation focused on the identification of themes
and did not form judgments on interviewee responses. To
further reduce bias the interview guide was reviewed by
the research team and one unaffiliated third party. Inter-
view notes were also checked with recordings for accuracy
of interpretation.
The lack of peer-reviewed literature on RBF program
evaluations/impacts limited the amount of information
available through systematic review. The majority of the
literature review was derived from World Bank Results-
Based Financing for Health documents and the USAID
Health Systems 20/20 P4P Case Study Series.
Finally, this analysis was designed to present options for
US government involvement, and therefore does not
address specific options for other government actors or
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in the private sector and among other government actors
and global health entities and possibilities for the use of
these strategies for NCDs is warranted.Conclusion
Research findings suggest that RBF mechanisms may be
effectively used to positively affect NCD prevention and
control in resource-limited settings. Both PBF and PBC
schemes have shown promising results in programs fo-
cused on MCH, HSS and communicable diseases, and
CCT programs have important implications for health
outcomes through poverty reduction. Evidence and les-
sons learned from these programs provide the basis for
designing and piloting RBF programs for NCDs. While
this evidence provides a basis, rigorous monitoring and
impact evaluation of new and existing RBF programs is
necessary to continue building the body of evidence.
It is important to emphasize that RBF is one of several
mechanisms that countries such as the US can use to
combat NCDs in LMICs. These could include efforts by
the US to promote behavior change in LMICs. Incen-
tives for individuals have been shown to result in behav-
ior change and such programs could also receive greater
consideration [53,54]. In addition, some of the most ef-
fective strategies for combatting NCDs may not lend
themselves to RBF mechanisms. Therefore, all potential
strategies should be considered and the best practices
for reducing NCDs should be utilized, incorporating
RBF mechanisms where appropriate and as part of a lar-
ger comprehensive NCD strategy.Implications for practice
Given the significant amount of DAH from the US gov-
ernment and the great influence the US has on global
health priorities, the US has the ability to significantly
affect NCDs in LMICs. Developing a comprehensive
strategy for the use of RBF within the US government
global health agencies could serve to improve health per-
formance and use aid more efficiently.
Given the increasing challenges and burden of disease
from NCDs in LMICs, NCDs are a top priority area for
global health. RBF principles can be applied to NCD
programs, taking into account the evidence currently
available from existing RBF schemes. The US has a num-
ber of options available to effectively examine the applic-
ability of RBF for NCDs, and to incorporate RBF as part
of a broader NCD strategy to have a significant impact
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